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paper concludes that Germany will likely extend its international activities in this area, both within the 
European Union and beyond in global negotiations, in the medium to long term. 
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German Interests and Priorities in European Environmental 
Policy
Helge Jörgens / Barbara Saerbeck
Since the 1960s, environmental policy has become a 
key focus of German national policy. Almost all indus-
trialised countries have created national ministries 
for the environment and other bodies, and passed 
numerous environmental laws since the early 1970s.1 
In Germany, the Federal Government’s first environ-
mental programme in 1971 and the creation of the 
Umweltbundesamt (German Environment Agency) in 
1974 form the foundations of the country’s current en-
vironmental policy.2 
“Today, effective environmental policy 
can only be thought of in terms of a 
combination of domestic and foreign 
policy.”
Initially, environmental policy was first and foremost 
a branch of domestic policy. As, from the early 1980s 
onwards, awareness of cross-border environmental 
impacts (e.g. forest dieback) grew, environmental 
policy increasingly became an integral part of foreign 
policy.3 Today, effective environmental policy can only 
be thought of in terms of a combination of domestic 
and foreign policy. On the one hand, nation states are 
ever more reliant on cooperation with other countries 
in the implementation of their environmental policy 
aims. On the other hand, only countries that adopt 
ambitious domestic environmental protection pro-
grammes can play a leading role in international envi-
ronmental policy. This interdependence between do-
1 See Per-Olof Busch/Helge Jörgens: International Patterns of Environmen-
tal Policy Change and Convergence, in: European Environment 2/2015, 
pp. 80-101.
2 See Edda Müller: Sozial-liberale Umweltpolitik. Von der Karriere eines 
neuen Politikbereichs, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 47-48/1989, pp. 
3-15.
3 See Volker von Prittwitz: Umweltaußenpolitik. Grenzüberschreitende 
Luftverschmutzung in Europa, Frankfurt am Main 1984.
mestic and foreign policy is particularly pronounced 
in the European Union’s environmental policy. This 
is due to both the geographic proximity of member 
states to one another and the fact that national envi-
ronmental laws are often harmonised across Europe—
now approximately 80 per cent of environmental laws 
in force in Germany are based on European Union 
legislation.4
In the following, first a short overview of the develop-
ment of European environmental policy will be pro-
vided. Then, the role of Germany in European envi-
ronmental politics since the early 1980s will be briefly 
outlined. Building upon this, five types of German en-
vironmental policy interests in European environmen-
tal politics will be distinguished and illustrated with 
concrete examples.
1. European environmental 
policy in flux
The development of European environmental policy 
can be divided into several phases. In the 1970s and 
80s, growing public awareness led to an increased 
debate on environmental topics at the European level. 
The adoption of the Single European Act in 1987 offi-
cially anchored environmental targets, principles and 
decision-making procedures in the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community.5 The European Union’s 
scope for environmental action has thereafter con-
4 See Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsi-
cherheit: Kurzinfo Europa und Umwelt, 30.04.2015, available at: http://
www.bmub.bund.de/themen/europa-international/europa-und-um-
welt/kurzinfo/ (last accessed: 12.01.2016).
5 See Christiane Beuermann/Jill Jäger: Climate Change Politics in Ger-
many: How Long will Any Double Dividend Last?, in: Timothy O’Riordan/
Jill Jäger (eds.): The Politics of Climate Change: A European Perspective, 
London 1996, pp. 186-227, here p. 194.
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tinued to be extended—whether it be through the es-
tablishment of the European Environment Agency in 
1990, the continuing adoption of new environmental 
programmes, or its anchoring in the Treaties of Maas-
tricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1997).6 International im-
petus via United Nations (UN) conventions on the en-
vironment has intensified its impact (e.g. Agenda 21).
Since the 1970s, the European bodies have enacted 
more than 300 acts of law for the protection of the 
environment under Art. 191 and 192 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Today, 
the European Union’s environmental policy features a 
multiplicity of different principles and instruments. If 
European environmental policy initially concentrated 
on the enactment of individual (technical) measures, 
it is now increasingly taking a holistic and integrated 
approach, focusing on the synergies between eco-
nomic, social and ecological goals. Based on the pol-
luter pays, prevention and precautionary principles 
the European Union adopted Environment Action 
Programmes (EAPs), which determine the framework 
and strategic guidelines of European environmental 
policy. 
“If European environmental policy ini-
tially concentrated on the enactment 
of individual (technical) measures, it is 
now increasingly taking a holistic and 
integrated approach, focusing on the 
synergies between economic, social 
and ecological goals.”
The 6th EAP “Our future, Our choice”, adopted in 2002 
and in place until 2012, named four key areas, which 
the European Union paid particular focus on in its envi-
ronmental policy during this period: (1) combating cli-
6 See Christoph Knill/Duncan Liefferink: Environmental politics in the Euro-
pean Union. Policy-making, implementation and patterns of multi-level 
governance, Manchester 2007, pp. 20-21.
mate change, including the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions, (2) protecting nature and biodiversity, 
(3) improving the environment, health and quality of 
life (measures which included tackling noise pollution 
and improving air quality) and (4) sustainable use of 
natural resources and management of wastes.7 The 7th 
EAP (adopted in 2013 and in place until 2020) largely 
reaffirmed these key areas and embedded them in 
a strategic vision for ecologically sustainable growth 
(‘green growth’) in Europe.8 In addition to the thematic 
priorities, emphasis is also placed on the promotion 
of innovative technologies in the areas of environmen-
tal protection and efficiency, and on Europe’s leading 
role in international environmental policy. 
In general, a continual expansion of the European 
Union’s environmental policy competencies and con-
sequently an increasing alignment of national envi-
ronmental standards and laws can be observed since 
the 1970s.9 On the whole, this alignment happened 
at a high level of environmental protection that was 
largely determined by national environmental policy 
forerunners.10 Thus, at least until the end of the 2000s, 
the European multi-level system acted as an ‘accelera-
tor’ of national environmental policy.11
7 See Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment 
Action Programme, in: Official Journal of the European Communities, No. 
L 242, 10 September 2002, pp. 1-15.
8 See Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action 
Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’, in: Official 
Journal of the EU, No. L 354, 28 December 2013, pp. 171-200.
9 See Katharina Holzinger/Christoph Knill/Bas Arts (eds.): Environmental 
Policy Convergence in Europe. The Impact of International Institutions 
and Trade, Cambridge 2008.
10 See Per-Olof Busch/Helge Jörgens: The international sources of policy 
convergence: explaining the spread of environmental policy innovations, 
in: Journal of European Public Policy 5/2005, pp. 1-25; Helge Jörgens/An-
drea Lenschow/Duncan Liefferink (eds.): Understanding Environmental 
Policy Convergence: The Power of Words, Rules and Money, Cambridge 
2014.
11 See Martin Jänicke: Multi-Level Reinforcement in Climate Governance, 
in: Achim Brunnengräber/Maria Rosaria Di Nucci (eds.): Im Hürdenlauf 
zur Energiewende. Von Transformationen, Reformen und Innovationen, 
Wiesbaden 2014, pp. 35-47; Martin Jänicke/Rainer Quitzow: Multi-level 
Reinforcement in European Climate and Energy Governance: Mobilizing 
Economic Interests at the Sub-national Levels, in: Environmental Policy 
and Governance, forthcoming.
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2. Germany’s role in 
European and international 
environmental policy 
By no later than the beginning of the 1980s, Ger-
many had developed into a forerunner in European 
and international environmental policy. In this role, 
Germany focused above all on a technology-based 
regulatory approach, aimed at reducing environmen-
tal impacts at their source. For this purpose, detailed 
technical measures to limit emissions based on the 
latest technology were made mandatory via laws or 
regulations.12 From the beginning onwards, Germany 
tried not only to follow its regulatory approach alone, 
but also to transfer it to other European states and 
the entire European level. On the one hand, tighter 
national environmental policy requirements led to an 
increase in the production costs for German compa-
nies in the short and medium term. As long as weaker 
environmental standards applied in other member 
states, Germany could face a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
European competition. Therefore, export-oriented 
companies in particular pressed the German Federal 
Government to strengthen its lobbying for an align-
ment of European environmental standards with 
Germany’s advanced regulatory level.13 On the other 
hand, a strong environmental protection industry de-
veloped early in Germany, which would become an 
important economic factor and motor for the crea-
tion of new jobs by the 1990s at the latest.14 These 
12 See Martin Jänicke/Helge Jörgens/Kirsten Jörgensen/Ralf Nordbeck: 
Germany, in: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(ed.): Governance for Sustainable Development. Five OECD Case Studies, 
Paris 2002, pp.113-153, here p. 118; Martin Jänicke/Helmut Weidner: Ger-
many, in: Martin Jänicke/Helmut Weidner (eds.):  National Environmental 
Policies. A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building, Berlin 1997, pp.133-
155.
13 See Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel: Germany. From Environmental Leadership to 
Partial Mismatch, in: Andrew Jordan/Duncan Liefferink (eds.): Environ-
mental Policy in Europe. The Europeanization of national environmental 
policy, London 2004, pp. 92-108, here p. 96.
14 See Birgit Gehrke/Ulrich Schasse/Katrin Ostertag: Wirtschaftsfaktor Um-
weltschutz. Produktion – Außenhandel – Forschung – Patente: Die Leis-
tungen der Umweltschutzwirtschaft in Deutschland, Umweltbundesamt: 
Umwelt, Innovation, Beschäftigung 1/2014; Jänicke/Weidner: Germany, 
1997.
industries also pressed for a Europeanisation of Ger-
man technology-based environmental standards, as 
it promised a major widening of the markets for Ger-
man environmental protection technology. An exam-
ple of the Europeanisation of the German approach 
to emissions control was the adoption of the Groß-
feuerungsanlagenrichtlinie (Large Combustion Plants 
Directive)15 in 1988, which—with its far-reaching and 
technology-based limits for the air pollutants sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxide—largely corresponded 
with the model of the Großfeuerungsanlagenverord-
nung (Large Combustion Plants Regulation) which 
had already been passed in Germany back in 1983.16
“a strong environmental protection in-
dustry developed early in Germany, 
which would become an important eco-
nomic factor and motor for the creation 
of new jobs by the 1990s at the latest.”
However, since the mid-1990s, Germany has been 
less and less successful in defending its regulatory 
approach against competing ones in the key areas of 
environmental protection, such as water conservation, 
waste management, and the control of air pollution 
and chemicals. An example of this was the Directive 
on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC 
Directive)17 which was adopted in 1996. Germany fa-
voured the approach of stipulating collective technol-
ogy-based emission limits for industrial plants. This 
was however superseded by procedural rules, which 
largely left the decision regarding the implementation 
of environmental standards up to local regulatory au-
15 Council Directive 88/609/EEC of 24 November 1988 on the limitation of 
emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, 
in: Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 336, 7 December 
1988, pp. 1-13.
16 See Christoph Knill: Europäische Umweltpolitik. Steuerungsprobleme 
und Regulierungsmuster im Mehrebenensystem, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 
2008, pp. 141-146.
17 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated 
pollution prevention and control, in: Official Journal of the European 
Communities, No. L 257, 10 October 1996, pp. 26-40.
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thorities. The local authorities’ discretionary powers 
were additionally strengthened through the integrat-
ed consideration of pollution of the air, water and soil 
and generation of waste.18 
Today, Germany belongs among the world’s forerun-
ners in, above all, climate policy and the promotion of 
renewable energy; its strategy in doing so is two-fold. 
On the one hand, it wants to trigger copycat behaviour 
via its model behaviour. On the other hand, Germany 
campaigns at the EU level (and globally in terms of 
climate protection) for a continued raising of the in-
ternational regulatory level, with the aim of a greater 
international integration of German measures. 
3. Fundamental types of German 
interests in environmental 
foreign policy
The previous section has shown that German interests 
in European environmental policy are diverse and 
characterised by interactions between the national 
and European policy levels. In this section, five typi-
cal interests which shape Germany’s environmental 
foreign policy in Europe will be distinguished.
In his work on environmental foreign policy, Prittwitz 
discerns three types of foreign policy interests in envi-
ronmental protection, which also apply to Germany: 
victim, polluter and third-party interests.19 Victim in-
terests aim to minimise environmental problems orig-
inating outside the borders of one’s own country. Pol-
luter interests play a role if national economic sectors 
18 See Christian Hey: Zukunftsfähigkeit und Komplexität: Institutionelle In-
novationen in der EU, in: Volker von Prittwitz (ed.): Institutionelle Arrange-
ments in der Umweltpolitik. Zukunftsfähigkeit durch innovative Verfah-
renskombinationen?, Opladen 2000, pp. 85-100, here pp. 91-94.
19 See Prittwitz: Umweltaußenpolitik, 1984; Volker von Prittwitz: Several Ap-
proaches to the Analysis of International Environmental Policy, in: Wolf-
gang Rüdig (ed.): Environmental Policy, Cheltenham 1999, pp. 38-70.
are particularly affected by European environmental 
protection regulations. Governments can then try to 
minimise the costs of environmental protection for 
their own economy by impeding far-reaching Europe-
an or international regulations. In contrast, third-party 
interests focus on the positive economic effects of the 
export of national environmental protection technol-
ogies. Here, Germany has an interest in a Europe-wide 
raising of technology-based environmental standards 
in order to open up new markets for its environmental 
protection industry.20
“Environmental and climate protection 
offers Germany a field in which it can as-
sume a leadership role internationally 
and at the same time present itself as 
an advocate of global good.”
In addition to the three interests outlined above, 
there is a fourth interest which features in the specific 
institutional context of the European Union, where 
national environmental protection laws and meas-
ures are often harmonised across Europe. Here, EU 
member states aim at “impos[ing] their regulatory re-
gimes, cultures, and practices at the European level” 
in order to “preserve national problem-solving tradi-
tions and institutions – hence minimizing the cost of 
legal adjustment to European legislation”.21 Germany, 
thus, has an interest in actively shaping EU policies in 
the environmental field. Fifth, Germany has, not least 
because of its history, a fundamental interest in be-
ing perceived positively by others. Environmental and 
climate protection offers Germany a field in which it 
20 See Martin Jänicke: German Climate Change Policy: Political and Eco-
nomic Leadership, in: James Connelly/Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel (eds.): The 
European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics, 
London 2011, pp. 129-146, here p. 142.
21 Adrienne Héritier/Christoph Knill/Susanne Mingers: Ringing the Changes 
in Europe. Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the State: 
Britain, France, Germany, Berlin 1996, p. 2.
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can assume a leadership role internationally and at 
the same time present itself as an advocate of global 
good. In the following, the five types of foreign policy 
interests will be briefly outlined and illustrated with 
concrete examples.22
1. Victim interests
Victim interests aim at avoiding environmental dam-
age, the causes of which lie outside of one’s own na-
tional border. Such cross-border environmental dam-
age can take many different forms. In rivers that flow 
across borders, the pollution caused by upstream 
countries can severely compromise the water quality 
and thereby its usage by countries downstream. For 
example, after a fire at the Swiss chemical company 
Sandoz’s plant in 1986, poisonous substances in the 
Rhine river led to the death of fish in France, Germany 
and the Netherlands.23 Following the accident, Ger-
many campaigned strongly for a strengthening of 
environmental cooperation between countries along 
the Rhine river. This led to the adoption of the Rhine 
Action Programme and the extension of the Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection of the Rhine’s 
competencies and the reinforcing of its goals and 
measures.24
22 Falkner suggests a different typology, distinguishing between “inside-out 
explanations that focus on the role of domestic factors in shaping for-
eign policy; and outside-in explanations that reverse the domestic logic 
and trace a state’s stance in global environmental politics back to its po-
sition within the structure of the international system”; Robert Falkner: 
The Nation-State, International Society, and the Global Environment, 
in: Robert Falkner (ed.): The Handbook of Global Climate and Environ-
ment Policy, Malden 2013, pp. 251-267, here p. 254. While it is beyond 
doubt that international factors such as global environmental norms (see 
Steven Bernstein: Global Environmental Norms, in: Robert Falkner (ed.): 
The Handbook of Global Climate and Environment Policy, Malden 2013, 
pp. 127-145) or processes of policy diffusion (see Per-Olof Busch/Helge 
Jörgens: Governance by Diffusion: Exploring a New Mechanism of Inter-
national Policy Coordination, in: James Meadowcroft/Oluf Langhelle/
Audun Ruud (eds.): Governance, Democracy and Sustainable Develop-
ment. Moving Beyond the Impasse, Cheltenham 2012, pp. 221-248) have 
an impact on how states define their foreign policy interests, the focus 
of this article will be mainly on the inside-out dimension of Germany’s 
foreign policy interests in the environmental field.
23 See Stefan Lindemann: Understanding Water Regime Formation – A Re-
search Framework with Lessons from Europe, in: Global Environmental 
Politics 4/2008, pp. 117-140.
24 See Thomas Bernauer/Peter Moser: Reducing Pollution of the River 
Rhine: The Influence of International Cooperation, in: The Journal of En-
vironment & Development 4/1996, pp. 389-415.
Possibly the most prominent example of environmen-
tal damage caused externally is the forest dieback in 
Germany, which stemmed in large part from large-
scale cross-border air pollution from other European 
countries. As a result of this forest dieback, Germany 
changed from being a ‘foot dragger’ to a forerunner 
in international clean air policy and in particular in 
the reduction of emissions of sulphur dioxide from 
power stations and industrial plants. Germany also 
campaigned successfully for the reinvigoration and 
tightening of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution.25 Thus, in both cases, the 
fact that Germany had been negatively impacted by 
pollution from other countries led to a significant in-
tensification of its environmental protection efforts.
2. Polluter interests
Polluter interests focus on avoiding too high of costs 
to one’s own economy due to environmental protec-
tion measures, resulting from European or interna-
tional environmental policy provisions. As Germany 
was, by the 1980s at the latest, one of the most impor-
tant forerunners in ambitious European environmen-
tal policy,26 this type of foreign policy interest played 
a less important role for the country. Nevertheless, 
there were cases, above all in the automotive produc-
tion industry, in which the Federal Government tried 
to block far-reaching European regulations or at least 
delay their coming into effect. One prominent exam-
ple was the planned adoption of the End-of-Life Ve-
hicles Directive in 1999. After the governments of all 
the then member states, including Germany, had sig-
nalled their support for the Austrian Council presiden-
cy’s compromise proposal, Germany unexpectedly 
withdrew its support prior to the first Environmental 
Council under Germany’s presidency of the Council 
25 See Jørgen Wettestad: Reducing long-range transport of air pollutants 
in Europe, in: Steinar Andresen/Elin L. Boasson/Geir Hønneland (eds.): 
International Environmental Agreements: An Introduction, London 2012, 
pp. 23-37.
26 See Jänicke/Weidner: Germany, 1997; Wurzel: Germany, 2004.
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of the EU. After ‘major lobbying’ by the German car 
industry, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder instructed his 
Minister for the Environment Jürgen Trittin to block 
the planned decision. Yet Germany’s attempt to pro-
tect its own economy from high environmental pro-
tection costs was ultimately unsuccessful due to the 
introduction of qualified majority voting in the Coun-
cil of the European Union in this area. The adoption 
of the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive was, however, de-
layed by more than one year.27 
A second example concerns the establishment of 
Europe-wide CO2 limits in the automotive industry. Af-
ter the failure of a voluntary agreement between the 
European Commission and the European Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) in 2007, the Com-
mission placed increased focus on the setting of bind-
ing limits of the average CO2 emissions of a manufac-
turer’s entire fleet of cars. This approach principally 
benefits manufacturers whose fleet is dominated by 
small vehicles rather than by larger and heavier ones.28 
German car manufacturers thus, from the outset, ex-
pressed clear opposition to this regulatory approach 
and demanded a number of revisions, in particular re-
ductions to the limits for producers of larger vehicles 
and multiple deductions (so-called ‘super credits’) for 
low-emission electric or hybrid vehicles in the calcula-
tion of the fleet’s average emissions.29 Due to the great 
economic importance of the automotive industry in 
Germany and also major lobbying by car manufactur-
ers and their associations, the German Federal Gov-
ernment stoutly defended the interests of German car 
manufacturers in the European negotiations against 
27 See Petra Holtrup Mostert: Die Umweltaußenpolitik Deutschlands: Auf 
dem Boden der Realität, in: Thomas Jäger/Alexander Höse/Kai Opper-
mann (eds.): Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen 
und Normen, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 394-413, here p. 409; Rü-
diger K. W. Wurzel: Flying into unexpected turbulence: The German EU 
presidency in the environmental field, in: German Politics 3/2000, pp. 23-
42, here pp. 30-35.
28 See German Advisory Council on the Environment: Environmental Re-
port 2008. Environmental Protection in the Shadow of Climate Change, 
Berlin 2008, pp. 99-101.
29 See Benjamin Sternkopf/Felix Nowak: Lobbying: Zum Verhältnis von 
Wirtschaftsinteressen und Verkehrspolitik, in: Oliver Schwedes/Weert 
Canzler/Andreas Knie (eds.): Handbuch Verkehrspolitik, 2nd edition, 
Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 381-399, here pp. 389-394.
the position taken by the majority of the member 
states. In doing so, the Federal Government suc-
ceeded in, amongst other things, delaying the adop-
tion of the limits as well as in establishing a bonus 
system, which meant that low-emission vehicles were 
disproportionately favoured in a fleet’s emissions’ cal-
culation, as well as in establishing a ‘limit value curve’ 
which allowed higher CO2 emissions levels for produc-
ers of heavier vehicles. Sternkopf and Nowak refer in 
this context to a “Europeanisation of the German car 
industry’s interests”,30 i.e. the transferring of the Ger-
man car industry’s interests to the European level.
“Overall, Germany tries to make its econ-
omy more competitive internationally 
by campaigning for uniform Europe-
wide environmental protection and en-
ergy standards.”
The cases in which Germany acts as a foot dragger 
in European environmental policy are mostly the ex-
ception rather than the rule. Overall, Germany tries 
to make its economy more competitive internation-
ally by campaigning for uniform Europe-wide envi-
ronmental protection and energy standards. The ex-
ample of the creation of a common European energy 
policy illustrates that Germany, in doing so, does not 
lose sight of its national interests. While Germany was 
already calling for the embedding of energy policy in a 
wider international context (also beyond the Europe-
an Union) in the early 1990s, other countries opposed 
binding regulations.31 As it became apparent that Ger-
many’s national practices could not be realised at the 
European level, the country began to constructively 
shape discussions on rules for the European Union 
electricity market and to defend its interests effec-
tively and independently. The directive resulting from 
30 Ibidem, p. 393; own translation.
31 See Susanne K. Schmidt: Liberalisierung in Europa. Die Rolle der Eu-
ropäischen Kommission, Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp. 194-195.
German European Policy Series No 04/17
10
these discussions,32 which came into effect on 19 De-
cember 1996 and concerned common rules for the 
internal electricity market, envisaged, amongst oth-
ers, a gradual process towards full liberalisation of the 
market. As in the course of the simultaneous amend-
ment of the German Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (Energy 
Industry Act) a unified national position in favour of a 
full liberalisation of the market in Europe had evolved, 
the directive was already implemented in Germany 
in 2000. In contrast, the degree of market liberalisa-
tion varied greatly between the member states and 
the European average was just 69 percent.33 In order 
to achieve a level playing field for its own electricity 
companies, Germany campaigned in the European 
Council for a full liberalisation of European electric-
ity markets. At the same time, Germany knew how to 
take advantage of exemptions, which were granted by 
the original directive due to security and sociopoliti-
cal concerns. Thus, Germany’s implementation of the 
directive was criticised by the European Commission 
and in particular by foreign companies and consumer 
associations because, in their eyes, it made it difficult 
for new players in the market to access the grid due 
to the lack of transparent conditions and excessive 
grid charges, thereby allowing individual companies 
to maintain their monopoly.34 The European Commis-
sion’s call for the ownership unbundling of the grid 
and the establishment of an independent regulatory 
body was rejected by the Federal Government.
At the European level, there was a realisation that the 
directive outlined above would not suffice to bring 
about an actual liberalisation of the electricity sector. 
During the negotiations for the so-called Acceleration 
32 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, in: Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 27, 30 
January 1997, pp. 20-29.
33 See European Commission: Commission Staff Working Paper. First 
benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity 
and gas market. Brussels, 3.12.2001, SEC (2001) 1957.
34 See Thomas Renz: Vom Monopol zum Wettbewerb. Die Liberalisierung 
der deutschen Stromwirtschaft, Opladen 2001, pp. 173-176.
Directive,35 concerning common rules for the inter-
nal electricity market, and the repealing of Directive 
96/92/EC, German actors, via skilful manoeuvring, 
succeeded initially in warding off disadvantages for 
the German economy; in doing so the regulatory 
body’s competencies and the exact conditions of the 
unbundling were severely limited.
Overall, in Holtrup Mostert’s words, one of the major 
aims of German environmental foreign policy is “to 
secure the competitiveness of the German economy 
via the cross-border harmonisation of environmental 
legal norms”.36 Falkner describes the underlying log-
ic, which he observes also in other highly regulated 
countries, as follows:
“ Faced with strong regulatory pressure at home and 
international competition from countries with low en-
vironmental standards, some business groups [opt] for 
a strategy of regulatory export to create a global level 
playing field or gain a first mover advantage”.37 
On the whole, one can say that Germany campaigns 
for harmonisation at a high level of environmental 
protection.
3. Third-party interests
Third-party interests in environmental policy take the 
form of “securing the greatest benefit for oneself in 
the process of environmental policy problem solving, 
so as to ‘profit’ from the third-party role”.38 The most 
important third-party interests in Germany are those 
of the environmental protection industry. This sector 
has experienced a high rate of growth since the 1970s 
and has now become one of the most important in-
35 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 
26  June  2003 concerning  common  rules  for  the  internal  market  in 
electricity  and  repealing  Directive  96/92/EC, in: Official Journal of the 
European Union, No. L 176, 15 July 2003, pp. 37-55.
36 Holtrup Mostert: Die Umweltaußenpolitik Deutschlands, 2011, p. 398; 
own translation.
37 Falkner: The Nation-State, International Society, and the Global Environ-
ment, 2013, p. 256.
38 Volker von Prittwitz: Das Katastrophen-Paradox. Elemente einer Theorie 
der Umweltpolitik, Opladen 1990, pp. 116-117, own translation.
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dustries in Germany. The share of Germany’s overall 
gross domestic product (GDP) made up by products, 
processes and services from the field of environmen-
tal technology and resource efficiency was 13 percent 
in 2013. An increase reaching over 20 percent of GDP is 
expected by 2025. The effects on employment are also 
considerable. In 2013, some 1.5 million workers were 
employed by environmental technology companies.39 
The high degree of regulation and the technology fo-
cus of German environmental policy have promoted 
the emergence of this sector. Now however, exports 
are of particular importance for its growth. A recent 
study put the growth of the industry in Germany be-
tween 1995 and 2005 down “almost entirely to its 
export success”.40 Between 2002 and 2011, Germany 
was the world’s leading exporter of environmental 
protection goods and resource efficiency technolo-
gies, ahead of even the US and China, with an average 
share of some 15 percent of total world trade.41
Against this backdrop, one of Germany’s central inter-
ests in environmental policy is the broadening of the 
market for German environmental protection goods, 
processes and services. This aim can be best achieved 
through a Europe-wide raising of environmental 
standards. There is still great potential for growth, in 
particular in the fields of climate protection and re-
newable energy,42 but also in the more traditional ar-
eas of water protection and waste management. Not 
least in view of the potential export market for envi-
ronmental protection goods, Germany campaigns in 
the European Union and also internationally for emis-
sions-related and technology-based measures and 
programmes. Against this backdrop, Germany has, for 
example, long spoken out against the use of the so-
called flexible mechanisms of emissions trading, the 
39 See Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsi-
cherheit: GreenTech made in Germany 4.0 – Umwelttechnologie-Atlas für 
Deutschland, Berlin 2014, pp. 117-118.
40 Gehrke/Schasse/Ostertag: Wirtschaftsfaktor Umweltschutz, 2014, p. 29; 
own translation.
41 Ibidem, p. 151. 
42 See Jänicke: German Climate Change Policy, 2011, p. 139.
Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implemen-
tation, in the negotiations on Europe’s climate policy 
position.43
4. Interest in shaping policy within the 
European Union
The increasing harmonisation of EU member states’ 
environmental policies has led in recent decades to 
outright regulatory competition.44 Member states 
compete to transfer their national regulatory ap-
proaches as far as possible to the European level, the 
aim being to influence the design of European envi-
ronmental policies, so that their later implementation 
at the national level requires the least possible politi-
cal, legal and administrative change.45 
An example of this Europe-wide regulatory competi-
tion is the question of the choice of instruments to 
promote the generation of electricity from renewable 
energy sources. Germany was one of the first Europe-
an states to introduce a priority feed-in tariff for wind 
and solar power in 1990. This instrument led to a 
rapid increase in renewable energy sources’ share of 
national electricity generation to around 30 percent 
in 2016.46 Other member states focused in contrast on 
the establishment of quotas for the share of electric-
ity produced from renewable sources. Energy provid-
ers could meet these quotas through the purchase of 
tradeable certificates. The advantage of the feed-in 
tariff was that it allowed governments to extend elec-
tricity generation from renewable sources very quickly. 
As the feed-in tariff for ‘green electricity’ was however 
set at a high level for several years, it led to a signifi-
cant increase in electricity prices in Germany and oth-
43 See Holtrup Mostert: Die Umweltaußenpolitik Deutschlands, 2011, p. 401.
44 See Héritier/Knill/Mingers: Ringing the Changes in Europe, 1996.
45 See Adrienne Héritier/Dieter Kerwer/Christoph Knill/Dirk Lehmkuhl/
Michael Teutsch/Anne-Cécile Douillet (eds.): Differential Europe. The Eu-
ropean Union Impact on National Policymaking, Lanham 2001; Héritier/
Knill/Mingers: Ringing the Changes in Europe, 1996; Knill: Europäische 
Umweltpolitik, 2008, pp. 132-136.
46 See Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy: For a future of 
green energy, available at: http://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/
renewable-energy.html (last accessed: 16.03.2017).
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er countries. The quota instrument tended to lead to 
a slower increase in the share of green electricity, but 
did allow governments to better control the costs of 
the switch to green electricity.47 A Europe-wide har-
monisation of national support schemes in favour of 
quota models, as envisaged by the European Com-
mission on numerous occasions since the end of the 
1990s, would have forced Germany to completely 
redesign its laws and procedures related to the pro-
motion of green electricity. In order to avoid these ad-
justments and instead retain its own well-established 
approach to support schemes, Germany repeatedly 
campaigned successfully against a harmonisation of 
national support schemes.
“The quota instrument tended to lead to 
a slower increase in the share of green 
electricity, but did allow governments 
to better control the costs of the switch 
to green electricity.”
The EU-wide harmonisation of national environ-
mental policy regulations has, however, another im-
pact, which can likewise influence the weighing up 
of member states’ interests. This impact is linked to 
the intertwining of federal and state legislation and 
administration as well as the resulting wide array of 
potential opponents to environmental policy regula-
tions, which is typical of German federalism.48 Ger-
many’s federal structure forces policy-makers to for-
mulate national policies within a highly differentiated 
47 See Per-Olof Busch/Helge Jörgens: Europeanization through Diffusion? 
Renewable Energy Policies and Alternative Sources for European Con-
vergence, in: Francesc Morata/Israel Solorio Sandoval (eds.): European 
Energy Policy: An Environmental Approach, Cheltenham 2012, pp. 66-84; 
Israel Solorio/Eva Öller/Helge Jörgens: The German Energy Transition 
in the Context of the EU Renewable Energy Policy. A Reality Check!, in: 
Achim Brunnengräber/Maria Rosaria Di Nucci (eds.): Im Hürdenlauf zur 
Energiewende. Von Transformationen, Reformen und Innovationen, 
Wiesbaden 2014, pp. 189-200.
48 See Héritier/Knill/Mingers: Ringing the Changes in Europe, 1996, pp. 56-
58; Fritz W. Scharpf: Optionen des Föderalismus in Deutschland und Eu-
ropa, Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 13.
discourse involving public authorities and private in-
terest groups at multiple levels of government. In this 
institutional context, environmental and energy pol-
icy programmes risk being weakened or nullified by 
strong opposition. But once advanced environmental 
protection policies are adopted at the European level, 
it is more difficult for national opponents to these 
policies to question or even reverse them. A political 
institutional lock-in effect, which changes the political 
majority required to bring about setbacks at the na-
tional level, is the result. 
“Germany’s federal structure forces poli-
cy-makers to formulate national policies 
within a highly differentiated discourse 
involving public authorities and private 
interest groups at multiple levels of gov-
ernment.”
Against this backdrop, Jacob and Volkery argue that 
the EU level can be an arena “for the enforcement of 
environmental policy interests against opposition at 
the national level”.49 Jänicke also stresses that high 
European environmental standards strengthen the 
position of the Ministry for the Environment within 
the Federal Government and in relation to state gov-
ernments or industry associations, which are often 
pressing for a lowering of, or at least no further tight-
ening of, German environmental standards.50 One can 
assume that in the case of the creation of the common 
European energy policy outlined above, the Federal 
Government was not averse to the shifting of the dis-
cussion to the European level. This way, it could partly 
dodge domestic conflict between the opposition par-
49 Klaus Jacob/Axel Volkery: Nichts Neues unter der Sonne? Zwischen 
Ideensuche und Entscheidungsblockade – die Umweltpolitik der Bun-
desregierung Schröder 2002-2005, in: Christoph Egle/Reimut Zohlnhöfer 
(eds.): Ende des rot-grünen Projekts. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder 
2002-2005, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 431-452, here p. 439; own translation.
50 See Jänicke: German Climate Change Policy, 2011, p. 142.
German European Policy Series No 04/17
13
ties, subnational entities, various ministries and pri-
vate actors and pursue its interests at the European 
level.51
5. Interest in a stronger role in interna-
tional politics
Finally, environmental and climate policy is a theme 
“in which Germany can shape its foreign policy profile, 
without having to give too much consideration to its 
political history or the circumstances of Germany’s 
division”.52 Sprinz has observed Germany’s major ef-
fort since the 1980s to be viewed as a European and 
global forerunner in environmental protection.53 Par-
ticularly within the European Union, Germany has up 
until now concentrated its leadership role primarily 
on so-called low politics, namely the foreign policy or 
international dimension of substantial sectoral poli-
cies. However, the increasing Europeanisation of en-
vironmental policy means for Germany:
“ a gradual loss of autonomy and profile in [environ-
mental foreign policy]. But at the same time it is also 
a chance to acquire greater significance internationally 
with the support of the European Union, than is pos-
sible for an individual country in the globalised world”.54
 Environmental and climate policy lends itself then as 
an appropriate foreign policy topic in two respects.
On the one hand, domestic policy factors such as the 
comparably high level of environmental awareness 
amongst the population and the exceptional size 
and strategic capability of the German environmental 
movement led to Germany being pushed time and 
again into taking a forerunner role in environmental 
51 See Jochen Monstadt: Die Modernisierung der Stromversorgung. Region-
ale Energie- und Klimapolitik im Liberalisierungs- und Privatisierung-
sprozess, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 224.
52 Holtrup Mostert: Die Umweltaußenpolitik Deutschlands, 2011, p. 403; 
own translation.
53 See Detlef F. Sprinz: Germany’s International Environmental Policy, in: 
Hanns Maull (ed.): Germany’s Uncertain Power. Foreign Policy of the Ber-
lin Republic, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 214-230, here p. 214.
54 Holtrup Mostert: Die Umweltaußenpolitik Deutschlands, 2011, p. 410; 
own translation.
policy.55 The position as a leading country in environ-
mental and climate policy is then but a small step 
away from an active and leading role in European and 
international negotiations as well as decision-mak-
ing processes. Thus, Germany took a leading role in 
the decisive phase of the international negotiations 
on the protection of the ozone layer from the mid-
1980s. The then Federal Government opposed the 
position taken both by its own industry and the Eu-
ropean Union and cautiously moved towards the US, 
which was demanding a ban on substances such as 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC). After Germany succeeded 
in convincing other member states of the necessity 
of far-reaching international regulations, the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer was agreed on in September 1987. Grundmann 
views domestic policy factors as the main reason for 
the change in Germany’s position: “After the coalition 
government had become involved in ‘green topics’ in 
domestic policy, it attempted to play a leading role in-
ternationally as well”.56
“Germany has up until now concentrated 
its leadership role primarily on so-called 
low politics, namely the foreign policy or 
international dimension of substantial 
sectoral policies.”
On the other hand, economic and political globali-
sation fosters greater emphasis on foreign policy in 
Germany’s environmental protection efforts. Today, 
Germany is less able than ever before to act alone 
nationally in environmental, climate or energy policy 
for an extended period of time. Germany’s interest 
in boosting its foreign policy profile is connected to 
the need to more strongly underpin and support its 
market-based national environmental policies with 
55 See Jänicke/Jörgens/Jörgensen/Nordbeck: Germany, 2002; Jänicke/Wei-
dner: Germany, 1997.
56 Reiner Grundmann: Transnational Environmental Policy. Reconstructing 
ozone, London 2001, p. 162.
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international policy. An example of this is the Ger-
man energy transition. The transition has led to a 
massive increase in electricity generated from renew-
able sources since the early 1990s and therefore also 
potentially to the significant decrease in CO2 emis-
sions. However, this effect is much less pronounced 
at the European or international level. Open markets 
and Europe-wide policies, such as emissions trading, 
counteract the positive effects on the environment of 
the German transition to green electricity. In particu-
lar, the low prices of CO2 emissions certificates in Eu-
ropean emissions trading have led in recent years to 
Germany once again generating increased amounts 
of electricity from coal, in addition to wind and solar 
power. While more expensive green electricity is con-
sumed in Germany, causing electricity prices to rise 
for the end user, excess electricity generated from 
coal can be exported abroad due to the low cost of 
CO2 certificates. Due to this, the German energy transi-
tion came under pressure from two directions; firstly 
from increasing national opposition to high and still 
rising electricity prices, and secondly from growing 
doubt about the environmental effectiveness of indi-
vidual national efforts at promoting electricity gener-
ated from renewable sources.57 
Against this backdrop, Germany developed a growing 
interest in a Europeanisation of its approach to the 
energy transition and the environmental modernisa-
tion of the entire energy system. This was particularly 
evident at the United Nations Climate Change Confer-
ence in Paris in December 2015, at which Germany 
actively forged new alliances in order to bring about 
a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol and to 
give new impulse to the European and global trans-
formation to a low-carbon economy. The interest in 
being positively perceived by others, strengthened 
by the necessity for greater integration of German cli-
mate and energy policy internationally, led Germany 
57 See Rainer Hillebrand: Climate protection policy: ecological modernisa-
tion, industrial competitiveness, and Europeanisation, in: Sarah Colvin 
(ed.): The Routledge Handbook of German Politics & Culture, London 
2015, pp. 373-388, here p. 383.
to once again intensify its long active role in interna-
tional climate negotiations.
A further area of international environmental policy in 
which Germany has played an active and leading role 
for many years is the discussion regarding a structural 
reform of the UN’s environmental institutions.58 How-
ever, Germany has up until now been unable to real-
ise its demands for a world environment organisation 
either at the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg in 2002 or at the 2012 United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 
Rio de Janeiro.59 
4. Conclusion and outlook
The depiction outlined above shows that a complex 
mixture of motivations underlies Germany’s interests 
and priorities in European environmental policy. It is 
to be expected that in different areas of environmen-
tal policy action different interests will win the upper 
hand. The case of international negotiations on the 
protection of the ozone layer illustrates that domestic 
pressure from a critical and environmentally-aware 
public combined with Germany’s fundamental inter-
est in a positive external image with regard to the com-
mon international interest was, in the end, stronger 
than the polluter interest in protecting the country’s 
industry from the high costs of environmental adjust-
ments.60 In other issue areas, polluter interests may 
ultimately have the upper hand.
Overall, one can expect Germany to play a particularly 
active role in European and international environ-
mental policy when different types of foreign policy 
interests are combined. This, for example, is always 
58 See Tanja Brühl: Umweltpolitik, in: Siegmar Schmidt/Gunther Hellmann/
Reinhard Wolf (eds.): Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, Wiesbaden 
2007, pp. 703-712, here p. 708. 
59 See Holtrup Mostert: Die Umweltaußenpolitik Deutschlands, 2011, p. 405.
60 See Grundmann: Transnational Environmental Policy, 2001, pp. 162-163.
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the case when third-party interests, i.e. the interest 
in opening up new markets for German environmen-
tal, energy and climate protection technologies, are 
combined with interests in shaping policy and/or in 
Germany playing a more visible role in international 
policy. This constellation currently appears most pro-
nounced in climate protection and in renewable ener-
gy policy. Therefore, it can be expected that Germany 
will extend its international activities in this area, both 
within the European Union and beyond in global ne-
gotiations, in the medium to long term.61 
61 See Dennis Tänzler/Stephan Wolters: Energiewende und Außenpolitik. 
Gestaltungsmacht auf dem Prüfstand, in: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Si-
cherheitspolitik 2/2014, pp. 133-143.
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